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We study the changing explanations of success and failure over the course of a firm’s history,
building on a discursive approach that highlights the role of narrative attributions in making
sense of corporate performance. Specifically, we analyze how the Nokia Corporation was
framed first as a success and later as a failure and how these dimensions of performance were
explained in various actors’ narrative accounts. In both the success and failure accounts, our
analysis revealed a striking black-and-white picture that resulted in the institutionalization of
Nokia’s metanarratives of success and failure. Our findings also reveal a number of discursive
attributional tendencies, and thus, warn of the cognitive and politically motivated biases that
are likely to characterize management literature.
........................................................................................................................................................................
Success and failure stories can be seen as present-
day corporate mythology. They are common in the
popular and academic management literature and
play a central role in the business media. Some
companies achieve celebrity status complete with
a positive reputation and a halo effect, whereas
othersare framedas losers. Somemanagersbecome
heroes to admire and emulate, whereas others be-
come objects of blame and stigmatization. Manage-
ment books and case studies that have traditionally
playeda central role in business school teaching can
be seen as repositories of these corporate narratives.
They are often based on clear-cut distinctions be-
tween success and failure (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002;
Raelin, 2009); they influence how we learn to make
sense of successes and failures and are pivotal in
management education and managerial practice.
Management booksandcase studies that focuson
success or failure stories provide ideas that man-
agement can theoretically use to renew their own
strategic practices (e.g., Alfalla-Luque & Medina-
Lo´pez, 2009). However, critical voices have noted
that these publications’ prescriptions may contain
major cognitive and methodological biases
(Denrell, 2003; McLaren & Mills, 2010). Overall, the
literature on the rhetorical and discursive aspects of
the presentation of corporate success and failure
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highlights the political and contested nature of such
discourses (e.g., Hegele & Kieser, 2001; Kieser &
Nicolai, 2005). “Reading managers” are exposed to
a host of explanations for successes and failures
(Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006), reflecting the views of cor-
porations that seek to control their legacy (Kuhn,
2008; Boje, Rosile, Durant, & Luhman, 2004) and
management fashions that make some stories more
plausible than others (Abrahamson & Fairchild,
1999).
Learning from the successes and failures of other
corporations has its problems. In particular, re-
search on social psychology suggests that making
sense of performance necessarily involves bias. For
example, causal attribution theory predicts that
people have a tendency to take credit for successes
and to blame either external factors or others for
failures (Heider, 1958/2013; Kelley, 1973; Weiner,
1985). Management scholars have also examined
and found evidence of such tendencies (Gooding &
Kinicki, 1995; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Vaara, 2002).
Although most of the research has focused on self-
attributions, it has also examined such tendencies
in the media (Mantere, Aula, Schildt, & Vaara, 2013).
However, with a few exceptions (Mantere et al.,
2013), there is a lack of understanding of how spe-
cific parties such as the managers themselves, the
media, and researchers differ in their constructions
and explanations of success and failure. We also
lack understanding of how such framings and at-
tributions change over time.
In our work here, we focus on the framing and at-
tributions of success and failure in themanagement
literature. Although we draw from the insights of
attribution theory and related findings, we use
a discursive approach to elucidate important ten-
dencies in making sense of success and failure (see
Brown, 2000; Mantere et al., 2013; Vaara, 2002). We
focus on the framings of success and failure and
transitions between the two. We examine how
something is labeled a success or failure and how
the narrative attributions of success and failure are
explained in the accounts of different actors. This
allowsus to developanunderstanding of the variety
of ways that specific instances of success and fail-
ure are constructed and dispersed through popular
management literature and the media.
Our research object is the Finland-based telecom
group, Nokia. That company can be seen as a re-
velatory case that allows us to examine both the
predominant framing and explanations of success
related to its rise to become a leading global player
in the 1990s and 2000s and its fall—in the narrative
sense—in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Our anal-
ysis is twofold. First, we study how the managers
themselves, the media, and researchers developed
explanations for the group’s success. Second, we ex-
amine how some of these same actors accounted for
the group’s failure inmore recent years, what types of
narrative attributions were involved, and how the
transition between success and failure took place.
Our analysis points to the central role of strategic
leadership, organizational capabilities, organiza-
tional design, and environmental discourses in the
accounts of both success and failure. It reveals
a striking black-and-white picture in which the ac-
tual framings and narrative attributions differ dra-
matically from each other in periods of both success
and failure. We propose the use of “metanarrative”
as a concept to refer to the overall intertextual to-
tality of narratives that jointly constitute a widely
spread and institutionalized understanding of the
success or failure of a corporation and its explana-
tions. We find that such metanarratives can be
characterized by cognitive and political discursive
tendencies, which provide a problematic basis for
managerial learning and education.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Success and Failure Accounts
As a Basis of Learning and Education
Stories of successes and failures of well-known
companies are at the core of the de facto reading
lists of practitioners interested in their own pro-
fessional development. Most managers do not, for
example, readarticles in theAdministrativeScience
Quarterly or books from theOxford University Press
(cf. Kieser & Leiner, 2009). Instead, their independent
learning and self-education are based on hetero-
geneous materials offered, for example, by the
business press (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006) and popular
management books (Furusten, 1999). Moreover, due
to the extensive use of cases in management edu-
cation, business school studentsareno lessexposed
to success and failure stories. However, as some
scholars have argued (Denrell, 2003), management
books and articles based on individual cases and
examples can have a potentially problematic role in
management learning.
In general, the research literature views the pro-
liferation of these success or failure narratives in
popular management books, Harvard-style cases,
company histories, and other forms of narrative
material as either a problem that inhibits effective
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management and management learning (e.g.,
Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006; Rosenzweig, 2009), or a sign of
the political and contested nature of management
discourses (Kieser, 1997). For example, the classic
study by Barley and Kunda (1992) reveals how vari-
ous ideologies of control coevolve with context
and practice. On the other hand, scholars study-
ing management trends and popular management
books assume that trends arise in a sequential
manner (i.e., each new one replacing the previous
one; Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999; Benders & van
Veen, 2001). Recent researchhasviewedmanagerial
discourses as a contested terrain in which many
different types of “success” or “failure” narratives
compete for attention and influence among practic-
ing managers (Scarbrough & Swan, 2001). In this
sense, consumers of these narratives have the
freedom to choose from a variety of potential nar-
ratives of success and failure.
We are not concerned here about the use or con-
sumption of success formulas (i.e., the managers
who read management books and articles; cf.
Kieser, 1997). Instead, we are interested in the
question of who produces these stories and what
kind of narrative attributions they reflect. Unfortu-
nately, studies on management literature, such as
the seminal article by Barley and Kunda (1992), have
not been very focused in the question of authorship
and insteadhaveconcentratedmoreon thestructural
determinants of the dominant managerial ideolo-
gies. An interesting exception is Furusten (1999), who
studies Swedish management scholars from a bio-
graphical perspective. In analyzing the work and
background of Richard Norman and others, Furusten
adopts an institutional perspective that emphasizes
the author as amediator betweenmanagement texts
and the wider institutional environment.
Another noteworthy exception is the nascent re-
search on corporatemyths. Kuhn (2008), for example,
studies the proactive and purposeful manner in
whichGMparticipated in the textual construction of
its public image. Similarly, Boje and his colleagues
(Boje, Rosile, Durant, &Luhman, 2004) studyEnronas
a multilayered, dramatized story-telling organiza-
tion. They use Boje’s (1995) earlier research on Walt
Disney’s role as an active participant in the building
andmanipulation of the Disney Corporation’s legacy
(see also Hegele & Kieser, 2001) as a framework to
understanddiscursivedynamics indifferent contexts.
Generally, however, management-learning research
has given scant attention to authorship in its discur-
sive sense. Thus, we have only scattered knowledge
about the extent of authorship in the claimsmadeby
management books and articles about successes
and failures. In particular, we lack empirical evi-
dence and theoretical insights to explain attribu-
tional and political tendencies in the discourses of
success and failure.
Discursive Construction of Success and Failure
Several strands of research have provided insight
into how success and failure are constructed and
explained. In particular, attribution theory predicts
that people attempt to understand the causes of
prior events tomake sense of their own performance
and to manage the future (Heider, 1958/2013; Kelley,
1973;Weiner, 1985). This involves biased tendencies,
such as taking credit for success and blaming exter-
nal factors and other actors for failure. For example,
research in sports and educational psychology has
focused on how athletes and students attribute their
successes and failures to different causes and found
clear biases (Si, Rethorst, & Willimezik, 1995; Bond,
Biddle, & Ntoumanis 2001; Gernigon & Delloye, 2003;
Locke, 2004). Such tendencieshavealsobeen found in
the management literature (Bettman & Weitz, 1983;
Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Fiol, 1995; Tsang, 2002).
However, these tendenciesmaynotbeasclear-cut as
the attribution theory would seem to suggest. For
example,Mantere et al. (2013) find that attributions to
failure may be of various kinds and serve different
functions with respect to the emotional process of
grief recovery (Shepherd & Cardon, 2009) and the
cognitive process of self-justification (Kieser &
Leiner, 2009, 2011; Staw, 1981).
Although the bulk of this research has focused on
managers’ own attributions, recent research has
examined the causal attributions made by external
parties. Wagner and Gooding (1997) find that when
managers receive equivocal information about their
own performance, they tend to associate success
with the organization and failure with the environ-
ment. However, when they receive a similar type of
equivocal information about others’ performance,
they tend toassociate thepositive outcomeswith the
environment and the negative ones with the orga-
nization. Similarly, Haleblian and Rajagopalan
(2006) argue that causal attributions by board
members regarding the causes of success or failure
influenced their decisions to replace theCEO. These
authors found that the more independent the board
members, the less likely they are to make self-
serving attributions in favor of the CEO.
External evaluations may also involve causal
ambiguity (Lippman&Rumelt, 1982; King, 2007), and
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informational, cultural, and other situational biases
can characterize the sense-making dynamics of ex-
ternal observers (Tsang, 2002). Rindova and her
colleagues have extensively studied the effects of
firm–constituent interactions on firm reputation
(Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Rindova, Williamson,
Petkova, & Sever, 2005; Basdeo, Smith, Grimm,
Rindova, & Derfus, 2006; Rindova, Petkova, &
Kotha, 2007) and identified the antecedents and
consequences of corporate “celebrity status”
(Rindova, Pollock, & Hayward, 2006). These authors
argue that there may be multiple intertwined, self-
serving biases in the media, because the media
creates a dramatized reality when reporting on in-
dustry change and corporate actions.
Also important, in recent years, scholars have
become increasingly interested in the discursive or
narrative aspects of success and failure (Brown,
2000; Mantere et al., 2013; Vaara, 2002). For example,
Brown (2000) examines how people accused of
questionable arms deals addressed these accusa-
tions by using self-deception, hypocrisy, and
scapegoating. Vaara (2002) studied how managers
constructed success and failure in their retrospec-
tive narrative accounts of mergers and acquisitions
and demonstrated how existing discourses provide
a variety of means for sense making. Mantere et al.
(2013) examine how managers, owners, employees,
and the media made sense of entrepreneurial fail-
ure by identifying specific narrative attributions:
catharsis, hubris, betrayal, and mechanistic expla-
nations. Although mainstream sociopsychological
research on attributions has relied on experiments
or surveys to establish cognitive patterns, the dis-
cursive approach focuses on the linguistic aspect,
which allows examination of how successes or
failures are framed and how success or failure can
be explained in actors’ narrative accounts. This
approach is useful because it enables us to examine
not only the constructions of success and failure by
focal actors such as managers, but also how other
actors, such as experts or the media, make sense of
success and failure.
RESEARCH METHOD AND ANALYSIS
To understand how managers and other actors
make sense of success or failure, we studied publi-
cations that focus on the Nokia Corporation. Nokia
provides a revealing case for our analysis for sev-
eral reasons. First, as a pioneer in mobile tele-
phones that became the global market leader in the
late 1990s, Nokia has attracted attention from book
authors, academics, historians, business scholars,
and others interested in the corporation’s “success
formula.” Later, at the end of the 2000s, the corpora-
tion faced a crisis that led to a new discussion—this
time describing and explaining the company’s fail-
ure in and exit from the mobile telephone business.
Second, the existence of a large number of publica-
tions of both Nokia’s success and failure enabled us
to identify a corpus of Nokia-specific literature and
to collect the extensive material needed for discur-
sive analysis. Third, Nokia is also an important re-
search topic due to its symbolic position in Finnish
society. Although Nokia has received global atten-
tion, the consequences of its success and failure
were most important in Finland, where it had be-
come a symbol of professional management and
innovativeness (cf. Lamberg, Laukia, & Ojala, 2014).
When Nokia became the opposite, the societal ef-
fects of that transformation were magnified be-
cause Nokia’s oft-imitated (especially by public
organizations) management practices were sud-
denly questioned.
Our analysis focuses on two distinctive periods in
Nokia’s history: (1) its strategic turnaround and rise
to a leadership position in the mobile telephone in-
dustry in the 1990s; and (2) the erosion of its mar-
ket leader position after 2006 as a consequence of
regime-changing business model innovations by
Apple, Samsung, and Google. Figure 1 below pro-
vides an overview of not only the key turning points,
but also the publications explaining Nokia’s suc-
cess and failure. The research design allows us to
compare the explanations of success with those of
failure. Although Nokia represents an extreme case
that does not lend itself to empirical generalizability
(Mahoney & Goertz, 2006), it has the potential to en-
hance our theoretical understanding of the framing
of success and failure and the different narrative
attributions.
Data Collection
The first step in our research process was to collect
a comprehensive list of the publications regarding
Nokia and its contemporary history. The goal was to
find all the books and articles on Nokia that had
beenpublishedboth in Finlandand internationally
since the 1990s. We searched for Nokia-related
publications by using standard reference data-
bases containing articles and book listings from
a wide variety of publications (see Appendix 1).
We selected items for inclusion in the study that
(1) in some way addressed Nokia’s turnaround
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and success in1989–2000 (cf.Aspara,Lamberg,Laukia,
& Tikkanen, 2011) or Nokia’s market erosion in the
mobile-telephone business in 2006–2013; and (2)
contained text that addressed Nokia’s success or
failure in narrative format. We omitted publications
that consisted of statistical and other types of formal
analyses (e.g., Keil, McGrath, & Tukiainen, 2009).
We identified, read, and carefully examined 81
relevant publications. This was an iterative pro-
cess involving several encounters with scholars
studying Nokia and Nokia managers monitoring
Nokia-specific literature.Webelieve that our list of
81 books and articles is close to the total pop-
ulation of published texts in narrative format on
Nokia’s evolution from 1990 to 2014 and even if we
missed some texts, 81 publications represents
such a large amount of material on a single case
that we can relatively safely assume that adding
further publications would have added only mar-
ginal value.
To complement our data collection, we also
searched for texts in newspapers and nonacademic
journals. Althoughwe assume that published books
and articles contain more variation in terms of the
content of their success formulas, we recognize the
importance of media discourse on corporate self-
reflection. However, newspaper journalists need to
react quickly to ongoingprocesses,which caneasily
result in a high degree of homogeneity in their in-
terpretations (Zhong & Newhagen, 2009). For this
reason, we focused only on media texts that include
direct quotes from interviewees or in some cases,
from journalists themselves. This part of the re-
search process was important because many of the
book writers reacted in 2013 when Nokia’s mobile-
telephonebusinesswas sold toMicrosoft. Therefore,
the collection of media quotes allowed us to track
possible author-specific changes in discursive
sense making when the discourse changed from
success to failure.
Google
acquires
Android and
starts rumors
of its mobile
strategy
Olli-Pekka
Kallasvuo
becomes
president
and CEO
of Nokia
Nokia reaches 40%
market share in
mobile phones
Apple iPhone
is launched
to the market
Nokia’s brand
the 5th valuable
in the world
Nokia
acquires
Symbian
foundation
Nokia’s
financial
performance
starts to
deteriorate
Stephen
Elop
becomes
CEO of
Nokia
Elop’s
burning
platform
speech
Nokia loses its
position as the
largest handheld
manufacturer to
Samsung
Microsoft
acquires
Nokia’s mobile
phone division
A host of
publications
Jorma Ollila’s memoirs
critical to Kallasvuo’s era
accompanied by a host of
other critical publications
Juhani Risku’s
book is the first
openly critical
Nokia publication
Shift of discourse to reasons of failure
Publications elaborating Nokia’s success
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mikko Kosonen’s and Yves
Doz, book uses Nokia as an
example of an agile company
Dan Steinbock’s book frames
Nokia as an example of global
competitiveness, the
last success book of its kind
Nokia unveils
a strategic
partnership
with Microsoft
First Andriod
phone to
the market
FIGURE 1
Nokia Timeline and the Transition From Success to Failure Discourses
6 MarchAcademy of Management Learning & Education
Data Analysis
Ouranalysiswasabductive innature (Locke,Golden-
Biddle, & Feldman, 2008) and proceeded in stages.
Once we had gathered all the material, we searched
the texts for discursive framings and attributions of
success and failure. This phase was crucial because
we needed to decide which text segments to include
in our database. We focused on sentences that had
adirect causal proposition regardingNokia’s success
or failure. Another alternative would have been to
analyze the text quantitatively (e.g., Duriau, Reger, &
Pfarrer, 2007). However, becausewesought to identify
theprocesses of discursive framingsandattributions,
quantitative analysis would not have sufficed.
We searched the texts for attributions of success
and failure. We identified 625 narrative attributions
by using a thematic analysis and iterated rounds of
intensive interpretative readings. In most cases,
identification of the arguments was relatively
straightforward because the texts used standard
language (either Finnish or English), and the causal
arguments played a central role in the texts. After
identifying the 625 arguments, we listed their at-
tributions and illustrative inserts in an Excel
spreadsheet.
Wealso collected informationabout theauthors of
the texts. To identify their professional and educa-
tional backgrounds, we performed a biographical
search using academic and professional calendars
(e.g., “who’s who” types of publications), web
searches, and interviews with Nokia researchers.
Accordingly, all the attributions were coded and
assembled into a table that included details about
their respective authors, availability of primary
sources, and publication dates. We also coded when
these attributions were made with the aim of obtain-
ing an accurate representation of how narratives of
Nokia’s success and failure evolved over time.
At the next stage of the analysis, we used the 625
attributions for identifying four broad discursive
categories, which included both firm-endogenous
factors (strategic leadership, capabilities, and or-
ganizational design) and firm-exogenous factors
(the environment, including government and public
policies). These categories are also theoretical (cf.
Corley & Gioia, 2004) and provide links to broader
academic themes in the strategic management
literature (cf., e.g., to the classification in Ramos‐
Rodrı´guez & Ruı´z‐Navarro, 2004).
After we had identified the four discursive cate-
gories, two research assistants independently coded
the 625 narrative attributions. When coding, they
used Table 1 as a coding rule. The two coders
reached consensus about the categories in 81% of
the arguments. For the remaining arguments, we
used the following procedure. First, twomembers of
the research team and a third research assistant
coded the attributions on which we disagreed. After
obtaining five competing lists of codes,weallocated
attributions to the categories that were the most
popular among the five coders. Ultimately, one
member of the research team (who had not con-
ducted any coding) checked the categorization of
the disputed arguments. No changesweremade at
that point.
This led us to develop an understanding of the
specific discourses that the texts used tomakesense
of success and failure and their explanations. We
then analyzed these discourses more carefully in
terms of how success and failure were framed and
attributed. This helped us to better understand not
only the characteristics of the various alternative
accounts, but also how they collectively constituted
the metanarrative of success and later failure.1
Table 1 reports the coding rules.
To examine how the transition from success to
failure narratives occurred over time and how the
narratives differed among the different author
types, we also coded the relative weights that the
different author types (journalists, government
public policy researchers, academics, and former
Nokia managers) placed on the different explana-
tions of success and failure. We did this by coding
the success and failure discourses according to the
different author types and by examining the relative
use of the different discourses by each author type.
(Appendix 3 provides the relative prevalence of the
different discourses according to each of the four
author types.)
When the success narratives transformed into
failure narratives, the four discursive categories
remained the same, but the relative importance that
the different authors placed on the different cate-
gories changed. The figures in the Appendix show
this change in emphasis. Also of interest, all the
authors of the different Nokia publications reduced
their assessment of the influence of the external
environment on Nokia’s performance; that is, all the
1 Metanarrative is a concept sometimes used to denote societal
narratives, such as modernism, that explain the overall devel-
opment of society. We use this term more restrictively to refer to
the totality of the overall intertextual narratives that together
constitute awidely spreadand institutionalizedunderstandingof
the success or failure of a corporation and its explanations.
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author types regarded the discourse relating to the
external environment as relatively more important
when explaining Nokia’s success than when ex-
plaining Nokia’s failure. This is noteworthy when
considering thatNokiamight nothave failedhad the
competitive situation not have changed because of
Apple and Google. In contrast, most of the authors
regarded discourses related to the internal organi-
zation design and strategic leadership as more rel-
evant to explaining Nokia’s failure than its success.
Consistent with attribution theory, only the former
Nokia managers assessed that strategic leadership
playeda less important role inNokia’s failure than it
played in Nokia’s success. However, even former
Nokia managers tended to emphasize failures as-
sociated with strategic leadership when assessing
each other’s behavior.
Last, the analysis of the author types shows that as
success narratives transformed into failure narra-
tives, the authors with an academic background
changed their assessments the most. The govern-
mental public policy researchers revised their as-
sessments somewhat less, the journalists even less
than that, and the former Nokia managers revised
their assessments the least. Thus, the academics
seemed to be the most sensitive to changing the cat-
egories according to which they assessed successes
and failures, whereas the former Nokia managers
seemed to be more conservative and used mostly the
same discursive categories when explaining both
success and failure.
SUCCESS DISCOURSES
Nokia had been one of the largest Finnish compa-
nies since the 1960s and was a large company ever
since its 19th-century founding as a paper-industry
company. However, the framing of Nokia as a suc-
cess story became more widespread in the Finnish
context only in the mid-1990s alongside Nokia’s in-
creasing international reputation. First, Nokia’s
rapid international success catalyzed a series of
publications focused on explaining the reasons for
that success. For example, in 1996, a group of busi-
ness scholars, historians, and innovation re-
searchers publishedaneditedbook that specifically
asked “Miksi Nokia, Finland”—that is, “Why Nokia,
Finland?” (Lemola & Lovio, 1996). The academic
community was characteristically motivated to find
answers to the mystery of why Nokia was the spe-
cific company from Finland that was able to reach
a position in the international market, in contrast
to more predictable winners such as Motorola and
Ericsson. Second, managers who worked at or were
close to Nokia published a series of doctoral dis-
sertations based on Nokia’s evolution (e.g., Ala-
Pietila¨, 1992; Kosonen, 1992; Pulkkinen, 1997). Those
publications theorized the formula of Nokia’s suc-
cess inanacademically credibleway, thusaffecting
the discursive position of Nokia as a professionally
managed international firm. After this first series
of publications, Nokia became an example of the
successful coevolution of innovation policy and
firm-level capabilities (e.g., Paija, 2001b); a case to
exemplify different aspects of successful manage-
rial practice (e.g., Steinbock, 2010; Laaksonen et al.,
1998); and a topic in academic historical research
(especially Ha¨ikio¨’s official history of Nokia) and
popular books (e.g., Bruun et al., 1999).
Although the first wave of literature was not nor-
mative, it worked effectively to create a myth of
Nokia’s history and superb managerial capabilities.
The influence ofNokiaand themytharound its history
resulted in it becoming the dominant model of pro-
fessional management in Finnish society in the late
1990s and 2000s (practically until the “burning plat-
form”speechbyStephenElop).Overall,Nokiabecame
a synonym for superior management in Finland,
which partly explains the discursive dynamics in its
success explanations. We next elaborate on the dis-
cursive tendencies in the framings and attributions of
success and failure, assigning various success or
failure attributions to four discursive categories: (1)
strategic leadership, (2) organizational design, (3) ca-
pabilities, and (4) environment.
Discursive Category 1:
Strategic Leadership
Theactionsof individualexecutivesconstituteamajor
group of explanations for Nokia’s rise to global domi-
nance in the telecommunications industry. For ex-
ample, Bjo¨rn Westerlund, Nokia’s former CEO, is
credited for his caution toward the fast-growing So-
viet trade that existed at that time. Years later, this
cautionwas seenasapositive factor for performance
whenNokia’s geographically balanced international
trade saved the company from the effects of the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, other authors
argue that Nokia’s entry into the electronics and ra-
diotelephone industries would not have been possi-
ble without the patience of Westerlund and other
Nokia directors, who believed in the nascent di-
visions and their potential:
Nokia’s current strong position in the telecom-
munications industry canbeattributed to Bjo¨rn
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Westerlund. He had faith in the future of elec-
tronics and allowed the continuously unprofit-
able unit to continue operations for years
(Ma¨enpa¨a¨ & Luukkainen, 1994).
Kari Kairamo, the company’s CEO from 1977 to
1988, is also acknowledged in many texts as an im-
portant contributor to the company’s success. He is
seen as a charismatic and extroverted personality
who acted as the driving force behind Nokia’s initial
international expansion and as an avid supporter of
a flexible, dynamic, and constantly learning orga-
nization. Jorma Ollila was Nokia’s CEO when the
company turned around in the 1990s from near
bankruptcy to extraordinary growth. Ollila’s finan-
cial expertise was seen as crucial in the company’s
rise from failed conglomerate to successful telecom-
munications company. Moreover, many accounts
glorify Ollila’s personality and skills as the sources
of Nokia’s success. Whether it is Ollila’s public
presentations (Sokala, 2002), organizational skills
(Bruun, Walle´n, & Hyrka¨s, 1999), innovativeness
(Castells & Himanen, 2002), vision (Steinbock &
Porter, 1998), or negotiation skills (Steinbock, 2001),
many authors recognize him as a major contributor
to Nokia’s success story.
In addition to management personality-related
determinants, management’s key actions and strat-
egies were also identified as important success
factors. For example, Nokia’s successes in acquisi-
tions were attributed to management foresight.
Various texts argue that Nokia’s acquisitions of
Salora and Televa were crucial to the company’s
success because they brought competences in mo-
bile telephony and consolidated the development of
Finnish communications equipment under Nokia’s
roof.Others claim thatNokiawaswise toacquire the
U.K.-based Technophone at the beginning of the
1990s because by doing so, Nokia gained critical
production competences and an important foothold
in the French and Italian markets. We also found
argumentsemphasizing thatNokia’s involvement in
the electronics business and the company’s focus
on the emerging mobile communications business
were riskymanagement decisions that turned out to
be beneficial for the company. Steinbock (2001: 39)
describes these strategic decisions by Nokia’s man-
agement as follows:
Again and again in the course of its history,
Nokia has seized opportunities to enter new
and exciting businesses characterized by high
risk but great promise for growth.
It is noteworthy that authors representing Nokia’s
former management tend to emphasize the role of
strategic leadership and organization design and to
play down the role of external factors, such as the
business environment. In a presentation of his
book, Mikko Kosonen (Doz & Kosonen, 2008a), a for-
mer chief strategy and technology officer of Nokia,
commented on the role of management in Nokia’s
success, summarizing the overall feelings of ex-
Nokia managers by stating that “there were only
a handful of people and key decisions responsible
for Nokia’s success.”
The high importance placed on strategic leader-
ship is consistent with the core argument of the at-
tribution theory, according to which managers have
a tendency to bias their sense making of success
factors according to their own actions and the orga-
nization that theyhavebuilt. However, theattribution
of the role of strategic leadership quickly changed
from positive to negative when the performance of
Nokia started to deteriorate, as we report in the con-
text of failure discourses.
Discursive Category 2:
Capabilities
Although Nokia was founded as a pulp and paper
company in 1865, its first large-scale organizational
change occurred in 1966 when it merged with two
industrial companies of the same age (the Finnish
Rubber Works founded in 1898 and Finnish Cable
Works founded in 1912). Several authors argue that
the resulting conglomerate formed the basis for to-
day’s Nokia by providing the needed critical mass,
certain useful capabilities in theareas of electronics
and radiotelephony from the Finnish Cable Works,
and important customer relationships, especially
with the Soviet Union.
Some authors argue that Nokia’s early capabil-
ities in telecommunications were boosted by
a public bid for the supply of radiotelephones to the
Finnish Defense Forces in 1972, which resulted in
the company’s involvement in the electronics in-
dustry. These capabilities were developed through
various phases into technologies such as theDX200
digital exchange product, which later became the
backbone of Nokia’s mobile network technology
and its most successful early network product.
Overall, the DX200 exchange system is seen as
a defining step in Nokia’s involvement in mobile
communications because that product, along with
related new skills and knowledge, opened new in-
ternational markets for Nokia.
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Many authors argue that some of Nokia’s most
important breakthroughs were its involvement in
two mobile telecommunications standards—the
NordicMobile Telephone (NMT) and a decade later,
the Global System for Mobile Communication
(GSM)—and the development of associated capa-
bilities. Accordingly, Nokia gained considerable
advantages frombeing involved in the formation of
these standards, especially theGSM.Manyauthors
contend that the pan-Scandinavian NMT standard,
introduced in 1981, gave Nokia a highmarket share
in the world’s largest uniform mobile-telephone
network, and as such, provided the company with
a unique testing ground, a first-mover status in
the industry, and a belief in the future of mobile
devices.
A decade later, the GSM standard emerged when
the first call from a Nokia telephone was made in
Finland in 1991. Several texts suggest that Nokia
gambled by developing capabilities based on the
GSM standard while involved in its formation.
These texts argue that as the mobile telephone
markets began to grow in the 1990s, the Nokia-
backed GSM standard soon became widespread,
which benefited Nokia immensely.
Other capability-related drivers have also been
proposed as sources of Nokia’s success. Some au-
thors argue that Nokia’s high levels of research and
development gave the company an advantage over
its competitors. Moreover, other authors portray
Nokia’s mastery of the value chain as a source of
competitive advantage. Last, the technological di-
versity of Nokia’s involvement in the varying mo-
bile technology standards is also identified as an
important aspect of Nokia’s international growth
and success. Various texts also portray Nokia’s
brand management as one of the company’s most
important success factors. The importance of the
company’s brand can be seen in the following
extracts:
Nokia has highlighted the life-style feature of
communications in its brand building - a strat-
egy that explains an important share of its
breakthrough. (Paija, 2001a)
Nokia had products for every consumer on
the planet . . . we avoided pushing the same
model everywhere. Instead we tailored our
products to meet the local expectations and
changing consumer habits. Andwewere very
often successful in that. (Ollila & Saukkomaa,
2013: 466)
Discursive Category 3:
Organizational Design
Several authors argued that Nokia’smanagement kept
the company’s processes flexible and dynamic, which
madeNokia better able than its competitors to confront
challenges. Furthermore, many authors stated that the
company’s extensive collaboration with its network in
both production and R&D resulted in superior perfor-
mance, efficient logistics, andamodern,well-managed
supply chain. In addition, Nokia’s culture was de-
scribed in many texts as atypical, and many con-
sider that a part of Nokia’s success. Various authors
described Nokia’s culture as ranging from humble
(Bruun, Walle´n, & Hyrka¨s, 1999) to innovation- and
initiative-driven (Steinbock, 2001; Lemola, 1996);
to continuous learning-centered (Koivusalo, 1995;
Castells & Himanen, 2002). The following passage
illustrates the admiration for the continuous-learning
orientation of the company:
[The] conscious and continuous thinking about
the company’s structure is considered an im-
portant innovation equal to its product in-
novations (Castells & Himanen, 2002: 132).
Jorma Ollila (Ollila & Saukkomaa, 2013), for ex-
ample, argued thatNokia’s strengthwas its effective
intraorganizational communication and the com-
pany’s values, strategies, and vision, alongwith the
quick dissemination of everyday information in an
easily accessible manner throughout the company.
Last,manyauthorsargued that oneof thekey factors
in Nokia’s successwas themastery that it displayed
in international expansion. Nokia was able to rap-
idly expand internationally, thereby acquiring first-
mover advantages in many emerging markets and
benefiting from economies of scale that would have
been unattainable in its small home market.
Discursive Category 4:
Environment
Authorswith a background in economics andworking
in research institutes were especially focused on
public policy and emphasized the environment—both
market and regulatory—as an important, if not
decisive, factor in Nokia’s success. For example,
many texts mentioned the early importance of the
Finnish government and the state-owned public
telecommunications operator (PTO), Telecom Fin-
land, in Nokia’s success. In addition, many authors
saw the PTOasa sophisticated anddemandinglead
customer forNokia. ThePTOwas seenasan important
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driver behind Nokia’s involvement in the Scandina-
vian NMT mobile standard, which was regarded as
a cornerstone of the company’s success by many
publications.
Another explanation of success focused on the role
of Finnish government policy. The government’s
policies on competition and deregulation in the tele-
communications sector were important for the evo-
lution of the Finnish telecommunications cluster and
Nokia’s success. Furthermore, the liberalization of
the Finnish capital market provided Nokia with
foreign investmentat thestart of the1990s,whichwas
necessary to finance the company’s focus on tele-
communications and the rapid growth that ensued.
Various texts—especially by government-sponsored
scholars—portrayed public funding as an important
resource for the early development of radiotelephony
and later for R&D programs.
Someaspects of theFinnishmarket havealsobeen
introduced as plausible preconditions for the com-
pany’s success.Unlikemost other telecommarkets in
the world, the Finnish domestic market lacks a mo-
nopoly. Various texts argue that this gave Nokia
a sophisticated, technologically progressive, and
demanding home market that drove the company’s
technological expertise and innovation. Some au-
thors also point to the importance of high mobile
telephone penetration rates in Scandinavia, espe-
cially in Finland, which, they argue, gave Nokia
a valuable feedback loop that helped it to realize the
potential ofmobile telephonesasconsumerproducts.
This attitudinal shift away from “yuppie” telephones
is described as immensely successful and as having
resulted in the most innovative products with ap-
pealing designs.
Last, many authors also argue that Nokia’s access
to skilled people in its home country was important
for the company’s success. Some claim that the
Finnish people’s perseverance, determination, and
open-mindedness toward technology might have
been a factor in Nokia’s success. On more than one
occasion, the distinctly innovative culture of Finland
as an antecedent of Nokia’s success is compared to
the Kalevala—the Finnish mythic national epic:
In the Finnish epic Kalevala, a researcher and
an engineer join their creative forces to help
the hero. Together, these early innovators cre-
ated the sun and the moon. Today, the task of
researchers and engineers—along Kalevala
Road and elsewhere—is only slightly less
daunting. Theywill have toworkwithdecision-
makers to forge a new, sustainable way of life.
It’s clear that Finland, especially Otaniemi,
will need to take a leading role in this effort
(Himanen, Au, & Margulies, 2011).
Institutionalization of the Success Metanarrative
and Its Implications
Taken together, these various success discourses
constituted an intertextual totality that reinforced the
framing of Nokia as a success story and reproduced
specific attributions as generally held explanations.
Characteristic of this discussion was that although
there were various viewpoints and attributions,
Nokia’s success itself and its key explanations were
not contested. Instead, new narrative explanations
added to the richness of Nokia’s success story but did
not challenge its key elements, such as the crucial
role of the top managers, Nokia’s capabilities, and
Finland as a near-optimal innovation environment.
The discussion thus led to the institutionaliza-
tion of Nokia’s success story as a widely shared
metanarrative. This is interesting per se; the meta-
narrativebecamean inherentpartof thehypearound
Nokia, and the metanarrative of success turned into
a canonical truth that almost no one dared question.
Furthermore, this institutionalization also had im-
portant consequences for learning, both inside and
outside the corporation. Specific positive versions of
Nokia’s success were disseminated internally and
used in internal training for new recruits. Externally,
Nokia was increasingly used as a case example in
both the media and in management education. It is
difficult to estimate the exact impact of all this, but
the hype clearly had major consequences for com-
panies and managers following Nokia’s example.
Moreover, the absence of criticism must have made
people less eager to challenge the company’s pre-
vailing strategies and practices in the early 2000s.
FAILURE DISCOURSES
The transition from the institutionalizedmetanarrative
of Nokia’s success to that of its failure was rapid. Im-
portant events included the company’s first quarterly
losses in 2009, Stephen Elop’s nomination as the new
CEO, and Nokia executives’ flight to other corpora-
tions. Stephen Elop’s (in)famous “burning platform”
speech and the widely shared news about Nokia’s
difficulties in meeting the competitors’ product offer-
ings, which led to increasingly negative media dis-
cussion in 2010. The first openly critical Nokia book
was Risku (2010), and other publications followed suit.
Some books and articles were clearly motivated by
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former executives’ willingness to save their histori-
cal legacy, which seemed to be the case, for exam-
ple, with Jorma Ollila’s memoirs. Overall, what
followed was a discussion that was very critical.
Although we found little criticism of Nokia in the
books and articles that concentrated on the rise and
success of the company, the opposite was the case
for texts focusedon theproblems that emerged in the
mobile telephone business.2
Discursive Category 1:
Strategic Leadership
Whereas in the explanations of Nokia’s success, key
managers such as Kari Kairamo and his closest exec-
utives or the “Dream Team” led byOllila were praised
for success, in the failure explanations, the emphasis
was on blaming such individuals or their erroneous
choices. For example, Stephen Elop is seen by some of
theauthorsasnotonly incompetent,butalsomalicious;
he was regarded as the mole or “Trojan horse” who
destroyed and sold Nokia’smobile telephone business
to Microsoft according to a predetermined plot:
TheyhiredaMicrosoft “mole”who forcedNokia to
convert to a new platform at the expense of
shareholders’money.Finally themolehanded the
revamped and Microsoft-ready mobile phones
division to Microsoft on a golden platter
(Anonymous financial sector expert, Talous-
sanomat, September 11, 2013).
Other Finns were deeply bitter and enraged,
and it was easy for them to find a target for their
ire: Stephen Elop. During his two-year tenure in
Espoo, he was ultimately responsible for a 62
percent drop in Nokia’s stock price, a halving of
their mobile phone market share, a precipitous
fall in the smart-phonemarket share from 33 to 3
percent, and a cumulative loss of €4.9 billion. He
was dubbed “Stephen eFlop” (Cord, 2014: 282).
Nokia’s directors will go down in European
business history as one of the most perverse
crews to lead a major corporation in the post-
war era (TeroKuittinen,Forbes,March 21, 2013).
A common explanation, especially among jour-
nalists and financial sector experts, was that the
executiveshad failed. This criticism focused onboth
current and former executives. Thus, Nokia’s down-
turn was seen as a series of wrong decisions: (1) the
neglect of innovations and products that could
have been triumphant; (2) the decision to invest in
Symbian as the main software package; (3) de-
cisionsnot to invest enough in Symbian; (3)Ollila’s
2006 decision to promote Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo to
CEO; (4) recruiting Stephen Elop as the newCEO in
2010; (5) the decision to publicly denounce Symbian
telephones in Elop’s famous “burning platform”
speech on February 8, 2013; (6) the decision to aban-
don Symbian and Meego and to choose Microsoft
as an ally for smart-phone software; and (7) overall
mistakes in strategy.
An interesting feature in the narratives that em-
phasize strategic leadership as an antecedent of fail-
ure is the personification of the corporation. In the
texts, Nokia was seen as corrupt, arrogant, lazy, slow,
inconsistent, focused on internal competition, and
threatened. Two business scholars offered the fol-
lowing interpretation: “Kallasvuo now sees that the
company did not pay sufficient attention to the emo-
tional undercurrents caused by internal competition
for resources to developa vast array of phonemodels”
(Huy & Vuori, 2014). Ex-Nokia executive Frank Nuovo
emphasized the laziness and stagnation that results
from the combination of normal corporate evolution
and large size:
I look back and I think Nokia was just a very big
company that started to maintain its position
more than innovate for new opportunities . . . we
realized at Nokia that touch was increasingly
important andwereworking toward doing it, but
when a company is really busy holding on to
what it has built, it is difficult to put enough of
apush toward something sodrastically newand
engender urgency in it (Frank Nuovo,Australian
Financial Review, September 6, 2013).
Discursive Category 2:
Capabilities
The capability-based failure arguments focused
on three categories: insufficient technological
knowledge in the top management team, an in-
correct approach to consumer marketing, and pro-
ducts that were inferior to those of competitors.
Many authors, especially ex-Nokia executives
and journalists, debated the question about the
need for technological knowledge among top
executives:
2 There is one important exception to the overall criticism. Both of
the historians who commented in themedia (Markku Kuisma and
Martti Ha¨ikio¨) were quite optimistic about Nokia’s future without
telephones.
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There is no need for the CEO to be an expert in
software development or technology. Instead,
she or he must be passionate to learn the basic
technological logics; andwillingandcapable to
find the right people for the right positions.
Nokiawasnotable to findmanagerswhowould
have built it as a software company. Nokia was
phlegmatic and powerless with Symbian [. . .]
when Pertti Korhonen left Nokia in 2006 the
software-specific understanding of business in
the top management team decreased dramati-
cally (Ollila & Saukkomaa, 2013: 458).
According to the capability narrative, the lack
of industry-specific knowledge on Nokia’s board
slowed down its responses to increasing competi-
tionbyAppleandSamsungandenabledadoption of
Elop’s new strategy. Some writers also saw the
combination of an inexperienced board (in the mo-
bile telephone business) and Elop’s insufficient
knowledge of the industry as the problem:
With the authority of a software expert, Stephen
Elop was able to convince the top management
and team and Nokia board that Nokia must fo-
cus solely on Microsoft phones. At the time, the
board of directors was in a transformation
phase: Risto Siilasmaa was just starting and
Jouko Karvinen and Kari Stadigh came from
outside the mobile phone business. However,
Elop had the same problem. He knew software
butnot themobilephone industryand itshistory
(Jukka-Pekka Raeste, Helsingin Sanomat, Sep-
tember 3, 2013).
Most of the writers who participated in the public
discourse regardingNokia’s failure consideredNokia’s
products inferior to those of Apple and Android.
According to this explanation, consumers began
to prefer the products of competitors, and Nokia’s
countermoves (e.g., E97) went badly wrong:
Thesoftwarewas inferior in termsof capacityand
design; and the phone suffered from elementary
technical problems. Anssi Vanjoki stated later
that N97 was “a huge disappointment for the con-
sumers’ quality expectations.” It was a polite way
of saying that N97was a total failure at amoment
when Nokia should have succeeded and turned
course (Ollila & Saukkomaa, 2013: 456).
JuhaniRisku, anex-Nokiamanager,wasevenmore
critical regarding Nokia’s abilities:
Nokia’s biggest problem and at the same time
the problem of its brand strategy is that the
brand is not construct of products and services;
it is built on a shallow marketing shell which
does not have a relevant link to product design,
concept building, and fulfilling the needs of
individual customers (Risku, 2010: 70).
Many of the failure explanations note that Nokia’s
attempts to address the new digital environment
went astray because of Symbian-related problems.
Kallasvuo explained that “Symbian was an old op-
erating system… to link newsolutionswasadifficult
technological challenge. That was one reason why
the decision to adopt Microsoft was made; the in-
terpretation was that it was impossible to continue
with Symbian” (InterviewwithOlli-Pekka Kallasvuo,
Former Nokia CEO, YLE, September 7, 2013). Last,
most of the failure narratives include an explanation
according to which after achieving a dominant po-
sition, the quality of Nokia’s products deteriorated.
Nokia’sproductsweresimplyno longerasgoodas its
competitors’ equivalent products and services.
Discursive Category 3:
Organizational Design
In terms of organizational design, there is less
agreement among the failure narratives than the
success narratives. A typical example is the above-
mentionedproblemwithSymbian,which isgenerally
seen as one of the system’s greatest shortcomings.
However, other voices argued that Nokia’s internal
systemswere the reason that Symbian never fulfilled
thecompany’sexpectations.Anex-Symbianengineer
accused Nokia’s leadership and the resource alloca-
tion system of preventing Symbian’s rise:
It is a mistake to assume that the reasons why
Symbian didn’t become the dominant mobile
platform were technical in nature or based on
the limitations of capability or design . . . the
Nokia leadership responsible for the Devices
unit’s execution of Symbian Open Source
products and initiatives was told directly that
the ecosystem (consisting of manufacturers
and suppliers) andour effortswould falter ifwe
didn’t have commitments to (1) relocate and
improvedeveloper tools under our openmodel,
(2) to have an effective App Store strategy,
e.g., not onehomegrownbyNokiaalone, and (3)
to secure our operating budget. We asked for
their direct support on all three . . . The Foun-
dation and our ecosystem initiatives didn’t get
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any support for those initiatives, despite sitting
down with the leadership at the key moment.
Quite the opposite, the rugwas pulled out from
under us at almost every turn (Interview with
Lee Williams, Forbes, September 3, 2013).
JormaOllila’s ownbook seesNokia’s organization
as a factor that was critical to decision making:
In spring 2009 I started to receive messages
from Nokia’s organization that the company
was not managed consistently. Issues started
to stack up, decision-making was slow, and
discussion had been transferred to large com-
mittees in which the focus was lost (Ollila &
Saukkomaa, 2013: 457).
Apple’s Tim Cook echoed this interpretation in
an interview by recalling that “Nokia’s internal
bureaucracy inhibited efficient software development”
(Interviewwith TimCook, BusinessWeek, September 3,
2013). These statements related to the period before
Stephen Elop. Dan Steinbock, who has also written
many success books, went further by claiming that
Elop’s new organization destroyed Nokia:
What followed was three years of massive
restructuring. It cut costs, as it had to, but it
failed to create revenues. Successful restruc-
turing can reviveailing corporate giants, but in
the case of Nokia, it all went terribly wrong
(Dan Steinbock, CNBC, September 17, 2013).
Finally, ex-Nokia managers argued that the in-
centive structure and matrix organization together
corrupted decision-making processes by eroding
the motivation of managers and channeling too
much effort into organizational politics.
Discursive Category 4:
Environment
Overall, the failure narratives report the changes
outside Nokia as fatal for the company. Perhaps the
most thorough description of the environmental
challenges faced by Nokia is that of researchers
from a government-sponsored semipublic Finnish
think tank:
Up until the launch of Apple’s iPhone in 2007,
and Google’s Android in 2009, Nokia and
Microsoft were indisputable leaders in their
own respective industries. Since then they
were both caught by the rapid convergence of
digital communications, information systems,
consumer electronics, as well as software and
digital content of various sorts. This conver-
gence broke the previously prevailing sectoral
silos and replaced them with a rapidly evolv-
ing “Internet of everything world.” Both com-
panies found themselves facing new and
unknown competition, and were forced to de-
sign new strategies fit for a newmarket regime
(Ali-Yrkko¨, Kalm,Pajarinen,Rouvinen, Seppa¨la¨,
& Tahvanainen, 2013).
That same degree of environmental determin-
ism also characterizes many other accounts. Dan
Steinbock, one of the most active Nokia authors,
described Nokia’s fall as an adaptation problem:
Nokia didn’t just struggle to make better
phones in recent years. It struggled to adapt
culturally to a new business environment. It’s
difficult to pinpoint precisely what cultural
changes were needed (Dan Steinbock, CNBC,
September 17, 2013).
Similarly, Jorma Ollila accused Olli-Pekka Kal-
lasvuoof not beingable to face competitivepressure
from Apple: “[T]he biggest mistake was that Nokia
under his (i.e., Kallasvuo’s) leadership was not able
to respond to the challenge of iPhone with a killer
phone” (Ollila & Saukkomaa, 2013: 458).
An interesting tendency among the failure narra-
tives is their emphasis of the unpredictability and
extremely dynamic nature of the market and com-
petitive environment, in contrast to the success
narratives, which emphasize Nokia’s ability to
sense and manage the environment. An underlying
theme in almost all of the failure narratives (in-
cluding those in the strategic leadership category) is
that Nokia’s destiny was determined by external
dynamics. Framed like this, a summarizing “meta-
narrative” becomes apparent: Due to personal and
organizational incompetence and behavioral errors
(arrogance, fear, and laziness) the environmental
turbulence became too complex and difficult to
handle, and the end result was public humiliation.
Institutionalization of the Failure Metanarrative
and Its Implications
These failure discourses form an intertextual total-
ity that increasingly framed Nokia as a failure case
and provided a number of explanations that could
be used to make sense of the failure. Just as in the
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case of the success discourses, the interpretation
of failure was increasingly salient. However, the
framings and attributions were more complex than
those in the success discourses. In particular, man-
agers and other actors frequently defended their
own actions and blamed others.
Thus, the failure discourses produced a failure
metanarrative that was widely shared and dissemi-
nated. This failuremetanarrative replaced thesuccess
metanarrative; in fact, the replacementprocess itself is
an interesting phenomenon. Many managers and
other observers were quick to reassess Nokia’s new
situation. This could be readily achieved by focusing
attention on themost recent events; therewas no need
tochallenge themetanarrativeofsuccessandat times,
it was possible to build on it. Either Elop could be seen
as the scapegoat, or the collapse could be attributed to
fundamentalchanges in theenvironment (e.g., thenew
category of smart phones introduced by Apple).
However, the failure discourses often also resulted
ina reinterpretation of the past, for example the long-
term effects of managerial decisions or Nokia’s ca-
pabilities or systems. Some expert observers made
special efforts to correct their previous assessments,
which nowappeared overly positive. For instance, in
his CNBC column on September 17 (almost immedi-
ately after the mobile telephone division was sold to
Microsoft), Dan Steinbock emphasized that although
Nokia had been at the peak of its success in 2010
when his most recent book had been published, Ste-
phen Elop destroyed all of the good that Kallasvuo
had achieved. Similarly, JormaOllila andOlli-Pekka
Kallasvuo have engaged in a discursive struggle
over where to place the blame for the decline.
Overall, the institutionalization of the failure met-
anarrative had significant implications for learning
both within and outside the corporation. Internally,
the focus turned to thecrisis,whichwasat leastpartly
aggravated by the collapse of the successful past.
However, it may also be that a sense of crisis was
necessary for renewal; this was visible, for example,
in Elop’s famous “burning platform” speech. Exter-
nally, Nokia could no longer serve as a success story
to be imitated. Failure became the issue on which
both the media and management education seemed
to focus, although Nokia’s selling of its mobile tele-
phone division could also be attributed as a success-
ful business exit instead of as failure of any kind.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis has focused on how success and
failure were discursively framed and explained in
the accounts of managers, experts, and the media
during the peak of Nokia’s success and after the
company experienced crisis. Although the same
types of discourses were used in both the success
and failure accounts, a closer analysis reveals
significant differences between the framings and
attributions. Table 2 summarizes the primary
characteristics of the metanarratives of success
and failure.
Individual managers and their decisions played
a key role in both success and failure constructions.
As could be expected, almost all of the author types
largely attributed success to managers’ skills or
specific decisions. In many instances, specific man-
agers came to personify the company in the sense
that the success stories had clear parallels between
the characteristics and personality of the key people,
suchas the twopowerfulCEOs, JormaOllilaandKari
Kairamo, and Nokia as a corporation. These success
accounts were frequently full of heroism and glorifi-
cation. The failure accounts also focused on the
managers and their actions; in particular, recent ac-
tions such as the recruitment of Stephen Elop and the
decision to focus on Microsoft were criticized. How-
ever, inmanycases, therewasalsoa re-evaluation of
the past; for example, Jorma Ollila’s actions were
now more critically evaluated. Like the success
stories, the failure accounts draw strong parallels
between the top managers and the entire organiza-
tion; for example, Kallasvuo came to symbolize mis-
takes anda lack of innovativeness.Moreover, hewas
often constructed as a scapegoat. The failure stories
also included conspiracy theories; for instance, see-
ing Elop as amolewhose primary rolewas to deliver
Nokia into Microsoft’s hands.
Organizational capabilities were used as more
long-term explanations of success or failure. In par-
ticular, Nokia’s capabilities, such as innovative com-
petence, were portrayed as key success factors. In
turn, the failureaccountsprovided reinterpretationsof
Nokia’s capabilities. Nokia’s innovation capabilities,
whichpreviouslyhadbeenpraised,werenowseenas
insufficient. Furthermore, changing times were seen
as requiring new capabilities that Nokiawas lacking,
thus combining capability- and environment-based
explanations.
Organizational-design-related attributes, for ex-
ample, the corporation’s culture and systems, were
also used as explanations of success. This was the
case, for example, with global logistics. At times,
the success stories also included accounts of the
difficulties and challenges that the organization
hadmanaged to overcome; these were later seen as
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valuable learning experiences. Together with the
role of strategic leadership, this area was the most
critically re-evaluated by all author types in con-
nection with failure. Whereas the success narra-
tives praised Nokia’s strategic agility, the failure
stories focused on the complexity of the company’s
organizational structure, committees, and a dys-
functional matrix organization that made it bu-
reaucratic and slow. It was also argued that
previous success had made the organization com-
placent, and thus, success could be used as an ex-
planation for failure.
Last, the success and failure accounts also fo-
cused on the role of the environment. Contrary to
what could be expected based on attribution the-
ory, the environment was much less central to ex-
planations of failure than it was to explanations of
success. The reason is that the environment was
seen as conducive to success in the success ac-
counts; for example, the role of the Finnish national
business system or the role of the government in
supporting innovation were frequently used as
explanations for success. In the failure accounts,
the environment played a different type of role.
Whereas Samsung’s progress and Apple’s devel-
opment of the iPhone were frequently portrayed as
a major change in the competitive environment,
these changes were often not seen as the main
problem, but instead related back to organizational
complacency, inward orientation, or Nokia man-
agers’ capabilities.
This comparison highlights four interesting is-
sues. First, it is striking to see how the same corpo-
ration could turn from an emblematic success story
into an outright failure in a very short period. In this
sense, our analysis is consistent with other recent
studies that point to examples where corporations
tend tomaintainaverypositive imageuntilproblems
accumulate, leading toa collapse in its public image.
Nokia’s case is not as dramatic as that of Enron (Boje
et al., 2004) or GM (Kuhn, 2008) in this respect. More-
over, unlike Enron, Nokia’s case is not about ethical
violations or serious wrongdoing. Obviously part of
the positive spin aroundNokiamay have been due to
its interest in a positive image, but more important,
popular and more academic commentators and ex-
perts contributed to and spread this success meta-
narrative—until Nokia’s problems were too big to
conceal. The diversity of different types of commen-
tators led to a proliferation of different success ex-
planations,whichcreatedahaloeffectaroundNokia.
Therewas a tendency to see everything Nokia did as
best-in-class. When the success narrative then sud-
denly turned to a failure narrative, it was almost as if
Nokia had betrayed its commentators and almost
overnight, everything that the firm did was seen in
a negative light, despite the fact that the divest-
ment of mobile telephones was most likely the most
efficient and fastest way to solve the company’s
problems.
Second, our analysis shows that framings and
attributions not only relate to specific events leading
TABLE 2
Characteristics of Success and Failure Discourses
Discourses Characteristics of success discourses Characteristics of failure discourses
Strategic leadership • Attributions to managers’ skills, specific
decisions, choices
•Attributionsofmanagers’decisions, choices (focus
on most recent)
• Personification of company • Personification of company
• Glorification of individuals • Scapegoating
• Conspiracy theories
Capabilities • Focus on unique capabilities
developed over time
• Reinterpretation of capabilities reframed as
insufficient
• Lack of capabilities needed to address new
challenges
• Inertia in focusing capabilities, routines to new
competitive regime
Organizational design •Focuson internal cultureas conducive to culture • Focus on lack of development in recent years
• Organizational systems as providing
competitive advantage
•Observations on internal problems growing out of
success
• Problems seen as learning experiences • Structure that inhibited efficient research,
development
Environment • Environment seen as conducive to success • Environment seen asmajor explanation of failure,
thus reducing managerial responsibility• Linkages with national business system
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to improving or deteriorating financial performance,
but also usually relate to the reassessment of the
corporation’s longer term development. Thus, the suc-
cess period tended to produce overwhelmingly posi-
tive accounts of the corporation’s long-term
development, going so far as to glorify the heroic deeds
of the company’s various CEOs, whereas the failure
period led to drastically negative interpretations of the
corporation’s history of “muddling through” instead of
possessing “heroic far-sighted visions.” This charac-
teristic bias is the essence of the black-and-white met-
anarratives of success and failure. Thus, in the spirit of
Rosenzweig (2009), our analysis should avoid taking
any framing of success or failure cases at face value or
sharing one-sided explanations without caution about
management practice or education.
Third, our comparison of success and failure nar-
ratives also points to the political aspects of these
accounts. On the one hand, managers and other
actors seek recognition and legacy, which is re-
flected in the success stories and their production.
Apart from the focus on specific individuals’ strate-
gic leadership, it is interesting to note that not all
managers were seen as heroes or were even recog-
nized in the success accounts. This was the case
with someofNokia’s cell-phone business’s founding
fathers, whose contributions were ignored in the
successdiscourses.On theotherhand, failure raises
issues of responsibility, blame, and even stigma,
and there are vested interests in promoting partic-
ular interpretations of the past and present. The
failure accounts can be seen as a search for scape-
goats and as a struggle to establish blame. It is in-
teresting to note how the interpretations of the
causes of Nokia’s failure by the three CEOs (Ollila,
Kallasvuo, & Elop) differ. Thus, failure discourses
arealsopoliticallymotivated. Thismaybeoneof the
primary reasons that the failure metanarrative is
more contested than the success metanarrative.
Fourth, the shift from the previous success ac-
counts to failure accounts is particularly interesting
from the narrative perspective. To simplify, refram-
ingNokia as a failure casemeant thatmanagers and
other actors also had to take a stand regarding the
past. One strategy was to focus only on the most
recent events and to see them as turning points; ac-
cording to this strategy, the past was less impor-
tant and failure was simply due to the most recent
events, decisions, and actions. Another approach
was to reinterpret the past and to challenge some
of the widely held assumptions; for example, the
strategic leadership, organizational capabilities, and
design that previously hadbeenpraised could be seen
as the key causes of failure. Yet another strategy, as
exemplified in the organizational-level explanations,
was to see the previous success, for example, in the
sense of complacency, as an explanation of failure:
Success and failure narratives become parts of the
same metanarrative, similar to the structure of a clas-
sical tragedy (Boje, 2008; Gabriel, 2010).
CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Although learning, both in corporations and on a
more institutional level in management education,
is based on observing businesses’ successes and
failures, we still know surprisingly little about how
popular management literature constructs succes-
ses and failures. This is unfortunate, as success and
failure stories may be characterized by cognitive
biases and simplification that can easily pass un-
noticed. Our motivation was to adopt a discursive
perspective to explore discursive framings and at-
tributional tendencies in the case of recent publica-
tions about Nokia Corporation.
Our analysis reveals a striking black-and-white pic-
ture in the success and failure accounts and shows at-
tributionaldiscursive tendencies thatcharacterizeboth.
In so doing, it makes contributions both to research on
theuseofmanagement literatureasabasis for learning
as well as to research on third-party attributions in
management and organization studiesmore generally.
Most important, our analysis helps us to understand
how success and failure stories are constructed in
popular management literature and what this entails
for management learning and education. Thus, our
analysis contributes to the somewhat dispersed but
growingbodyofworkonmanagement literatureand its
role in knowledge production and learning (Furusten,
1999; Kieser, 1997; Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999).
Although previous analyses have pointed to the
role of management fashions in institutionalization
(Abrahamson&Fairchild, 1999) and the implications
of management books for organizations and man-
agers (Furusten, 1999), our analysis complements
this body ofwork by focusing on the specific ways in
which success and failure stories are constructed.
By revealing the black-and-white framings and by
simplifying the attributional tendencies in these
accounts, our analysis underscores the need to take
a critical view of not only the success and failure
cases but also the success factors. This can be
seen as a major theoretical challenge for criti-
cally oriented research in the area of management
education (Morrell, 2008; Spicer & Bohm, 2007); it is
also a concrete challenge for practitioners.
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Second, our analysis contributes to research on
attributions in management and organizations. In
particular, our discursive analysis adds to the
growingstreamof researchondiscursiveandnarrative
attributional tendencies (seeBrown,2000;Mantereetal.,
2013; Vaara, 2002). We show how various accounts by
different authors jointly constitute metanarratives on
successand failure. From thisperspective, it is easier to
understandhow theprevailingdominant framingsand
explanations are created and to see how dominant
conceptions of successand failure are institutionalized.
In the Nokia case, the framings provide a clear-cut,
black-and-white view. Thus, our case serves as a re-
vealing illustration of the differences between the suc-
cess and failure attributions. In other cases, success
or failure metanarratives could be more complex, in-
cluding elements of both success and failure.
Overall, our analysis confirms general tendencies
such as the need to attribute success to specific in-
dividuals and the prominence of self-serving attribu-
tionsof failure.However, italsoshowsthat theseoverall
tendencies are not the only ones that matter. We must
also focus attention on case-specific nuances, such as
how interpretations of Nokia’s organizational capabil-
ities or design changed, or how changes in the com-
petitive environment have been accounted for. To our
surprise, the role of the environmentwas seen asmuch
less important in the failure attributions than in the
success attributions. As our analysis shows, it is im-
portant not only to distinguish specific explanations of
success and failure but also to see how they are in-
terrelated and how they work together to construct
metanarratives of success or failure.
Our findings are based on an analysis of one case
alone, and future research should compare these
findingswithother cases. Inaddition to theEnronand
GMcases, itwouldbe interesting to examinewhether
Apple’s or Microsoft’s success and failure stories fol-
lowsimilarpatterns to thoseseen in thecaseofNokia,
orwhether they tend to focusmore on the charismatic
leadership cults around Steve Jobs and Bill Gates. It
will also be important to examine and compare the
success and failure story types in different industrial,
cultural, and historical contexts. Although our anal-
ysis has revealed a number of interesting attribu-
tional tendencies, future research could go further in
the analysis of aspects such as forgetting (ignoring
the past in the new success or failure explanations),
scapegoating, and whitewashing.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to dig deeper
into the narrative genres of success and failure stories,
including epic, romantic, and tragic tales and combi-
nations of those genres (Boje, 2008; Gabriel, 2000). Our
analysis has focused on popular management litera-
ture, particularly management books. Other studies
could also concentrate on other media and examine
whether media accounts differ from those of manage-
ment books or academic articles. Another interesting
topic would be to examine how corporate reputations
aremanaged in successand failure accounts, and last,
it will be important to study the political struggles that
take place around publishing—with respect to both
management books and the media—and whether the
companies themselves actively participate in shaping
their own images.
Ultimately, ouranalysis indicates thatweshouldbe
beware of the cognitive and politically motivated
discursive and attributional tendencies that are likely
to characterize management literature. These ten-
dencies should be taken seriously, especially in
management education, because many central ped-
agogical practices build on examples of success and
failure. Moreover, specific companies and managers
also seem to be all too easily glorified or portrayed as
heroes and then as culprits or stigmatized in popular
management books and the media. If we are not
aware of these tendencies, we risk learning and
teaching partial truths, following management fads,
and reproducing celebrity culture in ways that do not
help managers address their complex strategic and
organizational problems and challenges.
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APPENDIX 3
Relative Occurrence of Success and Failure Categories by Author Type
0.0%
Capabilities
Journalists
Government
Academic
Former Nokia
Environment Organizational design Strategic leadership
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
FIGURE A3.1.
SuccessAttributions.The figure showshowmuch relativeemphasis thedifferentauthorgroupsplaced in their explanationsofNokia’ssuccess.
For example, of the total number of success factors identified by governmental public-policy researchers (Government), 19.3%were associated
with the capabilities discourse, 58.6%with the external environment discourse, 4.4%with the organization design discourse, and 17.7%with the
strategic leadership discourse.
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FIGURE A3.2.
Failure Attributions. The figure shows how much relative emphasis the different author groups placed in their explanations of Nokia’s
failure.
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